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Abstract—Fake accounts and Impersonators on Online Social
Networks such as Instagram are turning difficulties for society.
This has attended to an increasing interest in detecting fake
profiles and investigating their behaviours. Questions like who
are impersonators? what are their characteristics? and are they
bots? will arise. To answer, we begin this research by collecting
data from three important communities on Instagram including
“Politician”, “News agency”, and “Sports star”. Inside each
community, four verified top accounts are picked. Based on
the users who reacted to their published posts, we detect 4K
impersonators [1]. Then we employed well-known clustering
methods to distribute impersonators into separated clusters to
observe obscure behaviours and unusual profile characteristics.
We also studied the cross-group analysis of clusters inside each
community to explore engagements. Finally, we conclude the
study by providing a complete investigation of the bot-like cluster.
Index Terms—Impersonation; Bot Detection; Fake Profile;
Instagram; Social Media; Unsupervised Clustering.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most widely used social media is Instagram.
More and more of people, celebrities, sports players, politician,
and organizations are signing up for profiles. Some have
hundreds or thousands of followers spread across multiple
profiles. The potential of social networks is often mistreated
by malicious users who obtain individual information from
genuine verified accounts. One of the most common ways
of spreading fake news, disinformation, and false activities
is the use of fake profiles, where malicious users present
themselves in profiles impersonating fictitious or real persons.
Impersonators are those accounts that are pretending to be
someone we know or pretending to be or represent a company,
brand or organisation.
In terms of criminal law, in the United State, criminal
impersonation is a crime that is governed by states laws,
which vary by state. It involved assuming a false identity
with the intent to defraud another or pretending to be a
representative of another person or organisation [2]. In this
paper, with regards to Instagram as a growing Online Social
Network, we are investigating to answer questions like who are
the impersonators? in which community are more involved?
Among impersonators, how many distinct hidden groups exist?
what are their characteristics? and How impersonators are
involved in terms of reactions?
To answer these questions, at first, we picked three dis-
tinct communities on Instagram such as “Politician”, “News
agency”, and “Sports star”. Inside each one, we selected four
top verified genuine accounts and we collected a great number
of posts beside comments and likes (in a seven-month period).
For each one, we detected and extracted the impersonator
profiles and we ended up with 4K dataset. By using unsu-
pervised clustering methods like K-Means and Spectral, we
clustered them into three groups. The goal of clustering is to
determine the internal grouping in a set of unlabelled data.
Interestingly, each cluster represents the unique collection of
users on Instagram with distinct profile characteristics and
behaviour activities.
The main contributions of this study are:
• Identification of impersonators of top verified figures in
three major communities on Instagram including “Politi-
cian”, “News Agency”, and “Sports Star”.
• Perform an unsupervised clustering approach to find
inner-groups of impersonators based on profile metrics.
• Provide a comparison of clusters in terms of profile
characteristics and user behaviour activities to non-
impersonator accounts.
• Cross category analysis of clusters to understand the
distribution of activities and hidden actions.
• Provide a comprehensive study of the bot-like cluster to
understand how they are operating on these communities.
The remaining of this study is as follows. Section II gives
the related studies. The process of data crawling, the descrip-
tion of communities, and the dataset are described in section
III. The methodology of identification of the impersonator is
detailed in section IV. The full description of the unsupervised
machine learning approach is in section V. Then, the character-
istics of the clusters are compared in section VI. Additionally,
the cross-group analysis of clusters among communities is
presented in section VII and section VIII presents in detail
analyse of the botlike cluster. Finally, section IX shows future
directions and concludes the study.
II. RELATED WORK
Fake account: Recent research has worked on related re-
search problems and dedicated a fair amount of work to study
a different aspect of OSNs. In this era, looking to behavioural
aspect of users and understand the different pattern of activities
is still a hot topic of research. Several studies tried to shed light
on this direction by profiling users based on their activities
and reactions. This work [3] presents a novel technique to
discriminate real accounts on social networks from fake ones.
The writers from this [4] study provide a review of existing and
state-of-the-art Sybil detection methods with an introductory
approach and present some of the emerging open issues for
Sybil detection in Online Social Networks.
TABLE I
DATASET CHARACTERISTICS AND COMMUNITIES
Politician News agency Sports star
D. Trump B. Obama E. Macron T. May CNN Fox BBC Reuters L. Messi C. Ronaldo R. Nadal R. Federer
#post 44 11 27 66 56 68 183 35 10 8 12 6
#comment 130K 175K 50K 20K 53K 90K 100K 79K 211K 196K 16K 22K
#like 3.9 M 5.08M 880K 520K 1.76M 1.60M 4M 1.9M 14.5M 14.27M 1.24M 6030K
crawled
#profile a 500K 500K 500K 500K 500K 500K 500K 500K 500K 500K 500K 500K
a 500K randomly selected profiles from users who have reacted in the shape of Like and Comment.
Bot: On the other hand, the huge existence of Bots can alter
the perception of social media influence, artificially enlarging
the audience of some people, or they can impact the reputation
of a company. The problem of rising social bots are discussed
in [5]. There are various strategies to tackle the problem of
bot detection. [6] suggested a profile-based approach and [7]
proposed a novel framework on detecting spam content. Also,
[8] presented a machine learning pipeline for detecting fake
accounts and authors in [9], [10] present a method to classify
bots and understand their behaviour in scale.
User Behaviour: On another line of research, the authors
in [11] [12] look at the profile and behavioural patterns of
a user and discussed existing challenges on different OSNs.
By integrating semantic similarity and existing relationships
between users, it is possible to match profiles across various
OSNs [13] [14]. Also, [15] conducted a detailed investigation
of user profiles and proposed a matching scheme. On Insta-
gram, for the sake of mitigating impersonation attack, [16]
explored fake behaviours and built an automated mechanism
to detect fake activities.
As far as our knowledge, the problem of finding imperson-
ators on Instagram and clustering the imposters is not studied
in the literature and this is the first study that analyzed this
phenomenon.
III. DATA COLLECTION
A. Crawling
For the purposes of data collection, with respect to Insta-
gram API policies, we implemented an exclusive crawler in
Python to receive data and store in a MongoDB server in the
form of JSON files. In line with Instagram policies and user
privacy and ethical consideration defined by the community,
we only gather publicly available data that are only obtainable
from Instagram. The whole data collection process is designed
exclusively for research purposes and the data is stored in an
anonymized format.
B. Communities
To investigate and understand the behaviour of imperson-
ators and enhance the applicability of our model, it is essential
to maintain the dataset to consists of data from a variety
of categories. Toward that end, we extended the collection
process into three separate influential communities including
politician, news agencies and sports stars. As a result, we
are dealing with a wide range of profile characteristics and
user behaviours. In such a scenario, we have targeted the top
famous figures inside each community (Table I). All genuine
accounts are official and are verified by Instagram.
• Politician community is of high interest. Having a large
number of followers, fan pages, oppositions and support-
ers are the main reasons for selecting this community.
Additionally, Political Bot is a new phenomenon in this
area. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump) the president
of the United States, Barack Obama (@barackobama)
the previous president of the United States, Emmanuel
Macron (@emmanuelmacron) the president of France,
and Theresa May (@theresamay) the Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom (all at the time of writing this paper)
are included.
• News Agency is another vital community in which
top English language news broadcasters including BBC
(@bbc), CNN (@cnn), FoxNews (@foxnews), and
Reuters (@reuters) are added. Use of Social Media is
changing the relationship between the news agencies
and the viewer. This community has a large number of
audience from various groups.
• Sports Star community represents top sportsmen in
football and tennis. Nowadays, thanks to social media,
we see sporting star’s habits, milestones and personal
lives every day on our phones. Fake news, Fake profiles,
and Disinformation are considered as serious difficulties
inside this community. Leo Messi (@leomessi), Cristiano
Ronaldo (@cristiano), Rafael Nadal (@rafaelnadal), and
Roger Federer (@rogerfederer) are selected.
C. Dataset
In this study, we divided the genuine profile into three
distinct communities as described in section III-B. We believe,
while a wide diversity of audiences are included in these
communities, we have chances to discover unusual sorts of
impersonators such as political bots, sport fan pages, and
spammers. Our primary target is to analyse posts published
by genuine profiles and identify impersonators based on the
reactions. The data collection process began in October 2018
and continued until April 2019. In the seven-month period,
our specific-designed crawler was able to collect 550 posts,
1.3M comments, 20M likes, and 6M user profiles.
In Table I, #post shows total collected published post for
each genuine profile inside its community. T. May, BBC, and
R. Nadal have the most published posts in Politician, News
agency, and Sports Star communities sequentially. #comment
displays total number of comments issued in posts and #like
reveals cumulative likes that are given to posts. Among users
who have reacted to the posts (in the shape of Comment
and Like) we selected 500k profiles randomly (for each case)
and crawled their information as it is displayed in “crawled
#profile” row.
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF IMPERSONATORS
In our previous study [1], we provided a methodology
to detect impersonator from non-impersonator and explained
how to measure the profile similarity on Instagram. In the
current study, we also used the same technique. The important
profile features that are used are username, display name,
biography, and profile photo which indicate the characteristics
of the account. least common metric and most common metric
are respectively the minimum and maximum value that a
profile has a similarity in one or more of before-mentioned
features. To extract impersonators, we need to detect users who
have similar profile features compared to a genuine profile.
Therefore, for measuring the likelihood of text-features, we
utilized Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-
IDF) transformation using NLTK and scikit-learn packages
[17] [18]. Meanwhile, by employing a Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) learning method, we compared the similarity
of the photos [1].
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF IDENTIFIED IMPERSONATOR PROFILES OUT OF 500K
ANALYZED USERS PER ACCOUNT
Account DetectedImpersonator
avg. like per
Impersonator
avg. comment
per Imperso.
Politician
D. Trump 108 3.5 4.7
B. Obama 38 2.8 3.0
E. Macron 30 3.88 0.52
T. May 17 1.22 0.50
News
agency
CNN 12 1.3 1.9
BBC 4 0.4 0.8
Foxnews 16 1.42 2.14
Reuters 18 4.5 0.25
Sports
star
L. Messi 398 18.7 82.1
C. Ronaldo 2589 164.2 374.6
R. Nadal 189 22.9 7.5
R. Federer 213 27.6 28.8
Table II summarise the number of detected impersonator
among all use cases. Note that impersonators extracted out
of 500k analysed users per account. In term of population,
D. Trump, Reuters, and C. Ronaldo hold the largest detected
impersonator among Politician, News agency, and Sports star
communities, respectively. Additionally, C. Ronaldo has the
highest number among all. Avg. like and avg. comment show
the average number of like and issued comment by imperson-
ators in each use case. C. Ronaldo has the largest number in
both (among all).
V. WHO ARE IMPERSONATORS?
In this part, as the main purpose of this study, we believe
that with respect to our three major communities, imper-
sonators could have different motivations, aims, characteris-
tics, and behaviours. So, the primary research questions are:
among detected impersonators (see IV) how many potential
meaningful clusters exist? Who are they? What are their
characteristics? Accordingly, to discover these hidden inner
groups we will jump into using some well-known unsuper-
vised clustering methods. In other words, this will give us
insight into underlying patterns of different inner groups of
impersonators.
A. Clustering
The first step to apply an unsupervised clustering is data
collection (through the communities) which was described
in III and the process of impersonation detection is fully
explained in section IV. At this step, we have a nearly 4K
dataset of impersonators from all communities (Table II) that
can be used for clustering. Then, we picked the most important
features of the impersonator dataset and at the final stage, we
employed three famous clustering algorithms to arrange the
clusters and compare the results (III).
The impersonator dataset contains normalised 10 features
including username similarity, name similarity, bio similarity,
photo similarity, most common metrics (mcm), number of fol-
lowers, number of followees, number of media count, private
status, and verified status. To be able to visualise the dataset,
the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [19] procedure is
applied to the data. Using the Principal Components the data
is mapped into the new 2D feature space (Figure 1.b). Finally,
K-means, Gaussian Mixture Model, and Spectral Clustering
algorithms are applied to obtain clusters.
K-means is a clustering algorithm that returns the natural
grouping of data points, based on their similarity and has been
adapted to many problem domains. In order to estimate the
optimal k (number of clusters) for using K-means, we used
“Elbow” algorithm. It works by plotting the ascending values
of k versus the total error obtained when using that k.
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Fig. 1. Optimal k for K-means clustering (a) and PCA representation of data
(b).
Generally, In Figure 1.a as k increases, the sum of squared
distance tends to zero. It is obvious that as we add more
clusters after 3 it doesn’t give much better modelling on
the data. As a result, the elbow is at k=3 indicating the
optimal k for our dataset is 3. Next, we applied three popular
clustering algorithms including K-means, Gaussian Mixture
Model (GMM), and Spectral with parameters k=3 and ran-
dom state=100 for all case. PCA data representation with K-
means clusters are depicted in Figure 1.b.
Table III illustrates the result of clustering. Interestingly, the
results of all clustering methods are so close and all claim the
same outcome. So in general, from impersonator dataset, we
reached to three principal inner clusters that we are calling
them C0-Fan-Pages, C1-Ordinary-Users, and C2-BotLike:
TABLE III
CLUSTERING OF IDENTIFIED IMPERSONATORS BASED ON DEFINED FEATURES.
Cluster Populationpercentage
Similarity Percentage avg
#mcm
Profile Characteristics Activity Clusters’Given
Lableavg
#username
avg
#name
avg
#bio
avg
#photo
avg
#follower
avg
#followee
avg
#private
avg
#verified
avg
#mediacount
Cluster
0 50.33% 0.14 0.23 0.24 0.0 1.42 13.3K 737 0.0 0.01 124 Fan Page
Cluster
1 30.09% 0.09 0.12 0.29 0.03 1.25 587 637 1.0 0.0 77
Ordinary
User
Cluster
2 19.57% 0.24 0.45 0.17 1.0 2.85 10.6K 491 0.09 0.0 307
Bot
Like
a Most Common Metric: The maximum value that a profile has a similarity in one or more metrics (username, display name, bio, photo). Can be between 1 and 4.
• C0-Fan-Pages as we are dealing with different commu-
nities in this study C0-Fan-Pages could have different
meanings. For example, in Politician, both supporting
pages and opposition parties are considered as Fan Page.
Normally they have similarity in #username, #name, and
#bio features and all of them are public. The largest
amount of #follower belongs to this group and they are
publishing more than Ordinary Users.
• C1-Ordinary-Users group represents real users on In-
stagram that are expressing their feeling and showing
their support of something or someone in biography.
This can be done by putting a simple text, hashtag, or
mention someone. So while there is a tiny similarity
in #name, #username and #photo, but a big similarity
can be seen in biography. Average #mcm is around 1 as
there is similarity in just one metric. In comparison to
other groups, the number of #follower is fewer, they are
publishing less posts, and all are private accounts.
• C2-BotLike is the last and less populated cluster among
all. Botlikes mimick the real accounts in most of the
metrics. So, the average “most common metric” metric
is almost 3. They have a great number of #followers and
are so busy in terms of publishing post. Additionally,
each Botlike has the exact or similar profile photo of
the genuine account. These features indicate that Botlike
might be a kind of Bot (section VIII).
From another viewpoint, in terms of the population, the
considerable group is C0-Fan-Pages with more than 50% of
the whole and C1-Ordinary-User and C2-Botlike with 30%
and 19.57% respectively are in the second and third places.
This shows a big representation of impersonated accounts
acting as Fan of the genius account.
VI. ON ACTIVITY OF CLUSTERS
In this section, we aim to understand what are the major dif-
ferences between the activity of each clusters? In other words,
like differences in their profiles, do they have any distinctive
behaviours? Toward that end, we consider Comment, Like, and
Post features as user activities on Instagram. It is worth noting
that the mentioned figures on this study comes only from the
Comment and Like of users on the posts we have collected and
reported in table I. In other hand, the figures about published
Post (media count) shows the total published posts of users in
their profile.
A. Media Count (Published Posts)
Added major activity feature which plays an important role
in the identification of clusters is the media count or their own
published post in their account. By looking at the profile of
individual account inside each cluster, we can perceive how
active they are (in terms of publishing). The average rate
of publishing post from C2-Botlike cluster is 307 which is
2.5 times larger than C0-Fan-Page (124 posts), and 3.9 times
greater than C1-Ordinary-User (77 posts). Differently to the
other activity metric of this study (Like and Comment), this
metric belongs to the users account and include all published
posts of that users from the creation of the account. In other
word, this is not limited to our dataset and the crawled posts.
TABLE IV
ACTIVITIES OF CLUSTERS IN OUR DATASET
Cluster avg.#comment
avg.
#like
avg.
#mediacount
C0 - Fan Page 1.19 0.47 124
C1 - Ordinary User 1.56 0.48 77
C2 - Botlike 0.54 0.26 307
#comment and #like reported in this table represent the comments and likes
generated in the crawled posts of this study.
B. Comments
The next step is to analyse issued comments by each
cluster. Figure 2.a shows the cumulative distribution of the
age of the comment published by each cluster in compari-
son to non-impersonator group which represent all the non-
impersonator users. Generally, each cluster, in comparison to
non-impersonator, are publishing comments with a higher rate.
Within clusters, C0-Fan-Page has the greatest rate. In detail,
while in the first hour, almost 20% of the total comments
are issued by non-impersonator, the C0-Fane-Page and C1-
Ordinary-User issued 40% of the comments. In hour 10, C0-
Fan-Page and C1-Ordinary-User commented 20% and 10%
more than non-impersonators, respectively. C2-Botlike has
strange and unusual behaviour. It starts by issuing 20% (same
as non-impersonator) and peaked at hour 10 (20% more than
non-impersonator) and began to decrease.
Figure 2.b illustrates the same information with box plot
representation (in minute). The median value of C0-Fan-Page
and C1-Ordinary-User is close, but this number for C2-Botlike
and non-impersonator is larger. Interestingly, the range of C2-
Botlike is smaller than others indicating that it is commenting
in a short period of time. In contrast, the biggest rang is for
C0-Fan-Page cluster. In this box plot, C0-Fan-Page and C1-
Ordinary-User are commenting quicker.
In general, from Figure 2 we can observe that in terms of
commenting, C0-Fan-Page and C1-Ordinary-User clusters are
productive and they are issuing comments as soon as the post
is published. Additionally, in C2-Botlike cluster, there is a
strange and clear behaviour; botlikes began to comment from
hour 1 and peaked (and stoped) at hour 10.
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Fig. 2. Age of written Comments based on the timestamp of the corresponding
post. Non-impersonator group represents normal accounts that are not detected
as impersonators.
C. Like
Liking is another important metric which is surely valuable
for understanding the activity of an impersonator. In global,
Table IV presents the average rate of given like for all
clusters. While C0-Fan-Page and C1-Ordinary-User clusters
are so active in performing likes, in contrast, C2-Botlike is
the laziest one (same pattern in comment). Interestingly, While
C2-Botlikes published numerous posts (which is greater than
others), but has a smaller number in both average like and
average comment. Generally, we observe all clusters prefer to
issue many comments while they do not have the same level
of interest in giving like.
VII. CROSS CATEGORIES ANALYSIS
A. Distribution of cross activities
As the next step of this study, we desire to investigate what
is the behaviour of clusters among categories. Toward that
end, with respect to the population of clusters, we measured
the distribution of individual cluster through three categories.
To do so, we calculate the cumulative amount of reactions that
are issued in each community, then we divided each by the
number of unique users that are issuing them. So we achieve
the distribution of impersonating accounts per communities.
The result is shown in Figure 3.
In Figure 3.a the average written comments by users in
clusters are presented. While C2-Botlikes are heavily inter-
ested in political communities (17 comments), but published
fewer comments in Sports Star (with 3) and no comment in
News agency. In contrast, C0-Fan-Page cluster is commenting
equally (but fewer) in all three communities (almost 3).
Among clusters, C1-Ordinary-User is the laziest one in terms
of commenting (between 1 and 2). Figure 3.b shows the
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Fig. 3. Average cluster activities in all categories
average like given by impersonators of each cluster among
categories. The C2-Botlike cluster is pretty active in liking
political posts and is giving very fewer like to Sports star (with
1 like) and News agencies (no like). Also, It is interesting that
all clusters are more into politician community. Both C0-Fan-
Pages and C1-Ordinary-Users are almost giving the same rate
of like to posts from News agencies and Sports star.
According to Figure 3, we witness several exciting findings.
While C2-Botlikes are potentially interested in politics (as are
giving a high rate of comments and likes), in contrast, they
have no concern in News agencies at all. Also, on average
the number of given comments is three times larger than the
number of like. On the other side, C0-Fan-Pages preferred a
little bit to post comments rather than giving likes in response
to all communities.
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Let’s analyse the age of comments in each cluster. Figure 4
is the box plot representation of the age of comments issued
by each cluster across communities (in minute). With respect
to the population of clusters, in Politician community, C0-
Fan-Page is quicker, C1-Ordinary-User has a wider range,
and C2-Botlike cluster has the smallest range. Amid the
News agency community, C0-Botlike didn’t post anything,
C0-Fan-Page has the fastest react and the C1-Ordinary-User
is the laziest. In the Sports Star community, C0-Fan-Page
responded quicker following by C1-Ordinary-User and C2-
Botlike clusters respectively.
Generally, in the News agency community, there is a sig-
nificant difference between clusters. While C0-Fan-Page is so
active in this community, but C2-Botlikes showed no interest.
VIII. WHO ARE THE BOTLIKE CLUSTER?
In this section, we intend to understand who are inside
the C2-Botlike cluster? Are they definitely the representation
of a bot cluster? Therefore, we began mining to obtain any
particular patterns or bot activity.
TABLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF C2-BOTLIKE ACTIVITIES (LIKES AND COMMENTS
ACROSS CATEGORIES)
C2-Botlike
Category Account Like Comment
#botlike
portion of
post
Liked
#botlike
portion of
post
Commented
avg.
#comment
per post
Politician
D. Trump 13 15.9% 6 95.45% 2.2
B. Obama 3 27.27% 0 0 0
E. Macron 2 59.25% 2 14.81% 2
T. May 6 71.27% 1 53.03% 1.02
Sports
star
L. Messi 37 10% 4 90% 2.4
C. Ronaldo 193 12.5% 17 100% 5.6
R. Nadal 25 16.66% 6 50% 1.5
R. Federer 12 16.6% 0 0 0
Table V explains the activity of C2-Botlike cluster in
both reactions (Like and Comment) among all use cases.
Interestingly, while C2-Botlike showed interest in Politician
and Sports star communities, but there is no activity in the
News agency community. It means in our dataset C2-Botlike
impersonators have no curiosity in given like or comment to
the news agencies. #botlike shows the number of detected C2-
Botlike impersonator inside each reaction. It is crystal clear
that the number of detected #botlike impersonator in Sports
star (in both reactions) is greater than that number in the
politician.
Among politician, D. Trump has the most botlike with 13 for
like and 6 for comment reaction. in B. Obama case, #botlike
prefer to give like (3) rather than publishing comments (0).
Inside Sports star, while the portion of post liked from R.
Nadal and R. Federer is the same (16%), but the population
of #botlike for R. Nadal is double. Among all, C. Ronaldo has
the highest detected #botlike in both reactions (193 and 17).
Additionally, on average he received 5.6 comments in all his
posts (100%).
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Fig. 5. Age of issued comments by C2-Botlike cluster.
To analyse deeper, Figure 5 gives us detailed information
about comments issued by C2-Botlike. Plot 5.a is the CDF of
the comment age in hour. In the first hour (important hour), T.
May received around 70% of the total comments and took the
first place. Following her, R. Nadal, E. Macron, and D. Trump
caught nearly between 40% and 50%. Finally, L. Messi and
C. Ronaldo collected 20%, fewer than others. Additionaly, by
concidering the first 10 hours, while T. May, D. Trump, and E.
Macron received all their comments, but others still collecting.
From another viewpoint, Figure 5.b is the Boxplot represen-
tation of the same data (in minute). The median, average point,
and range of data for D. Trump and E. Macron is equal. T.
May, R. Nadal, and C. Ronaldo have the greatest range among
all, but C. Ronaldo is the laziest. As can be seen, while C2-
Botlike reacted to the post of R. Nadal and T. May instantly,
but they started to respond to others around the first hour.
Here is the analysis of C2-Botlike cluster:
• With average mcm = 2.85, they have the highest similar-
ity in profile metrics among others (see V-A)
• 100% of them used similar profile photo (Table III)
• The rate of publishing by this cluster is nearly 3 times
greater than others (see V-A).
• It has a pre-planned behaviour for publishing comment
among communities. C2-Botlikes began to comment from
hour 1 and peaked at hour 10 (see VI-B).
• While they have no interest in the News agencies, but
showed a clear sign of matter in Politician (see VII-A).
• In general, the portion of giving likes is more than
publishing comments by C2-Botlike (Table V).
In this study, we did not consider the text of comments and
we performed the analysis just based on the profile activities
and user behaviours. Regarding the findings in sections VII
and VIII we perceive C2-Botlike cluster in both Politician and
Sports star communities is the potential representation of the
bots.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In conclusion, we did an investigation to discover imperson-
ators in three leading communities on Instagram and apply
different clustering methods to uncover who they really are.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that conducts such
analysis on Instagram. We explained how impersonators are
identified and how are used for further investigations. By using
three clustering methods, we revealed how many hidden inner
clusters exist and we provided a full analyse in terms of
profile characteristics and user activities. Also, we provided
the cross-category analysis to see the interests of each cluster
in communities. Next, we moved one step further and analysed
the bot-like cluster to recognise any suspicious behaviours that
confirm they are bots. We considered profile characteristics,
comments, likes, and age of reviews.
As future work, we planned to consider the text to understand
what do they publish and see if there is any specific pattern in-
side. Considering Instagram Stories and IGTV could direct us
towards new findings of fake activities. Another viewpoint is
to study other social media and understand how impersonated
are operating.
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